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Access to Justice for Investors in the Wake of the Financial Crisis:
Test Cases as a Panacea?
By Franca Contratto*
While a number of European jurisdictions recently 
chose to introduce procedural mechanisms akin to 
U.S. securities class actions, a proper device for 
large-scale securities litigation under Swiss law does 
not yet exist. Given the substantial losses sustained in 
the course of the current financial crisis, this paper 
discusses the question whether there is a need to im-
prove investors’ access to justice in Switzerland. In its 
analysis of various innovative approaches taken by 
lawmakers in other European civil law jurisdictions, 
the paper puts special emphasis on the 2005 German 
Capital Markets Test Case Act (KapMuG).
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I. “Lehman Victims”: Paving the Way 
for Class Actions in Switzerland?
The Swiss financial centre, long praised for its 
prosperity and stability, is in tremendous turmoil: On 
the day of Christmas Eve 2008, Credit Suisse’s head-
quarters at Zurich Paradeplatz were beleaguered by 
dozens of disgruntled investors.1 According to cur-
rent estimates some 4500 customers of Credit Suisse 
and its subsidiaries Clariden Leu and Neue Aargauer 
Bank have lost more than CHF 700 million with in-
vestments in allegedly gilt-edged, “capital protected” 
structured products, issued by the now-collapsed 
Wall Street giant Lehman Brothers.2 It comes as no 
  1 SDA release, Demonstration vor der Credit Suisse, Leh-
man-Geschädigte protestieren beim Paradeplatz in Zürich, 
NZZ, 24.12.2008.
  2 David Vonplon, Dem CS-Chefjurist fiel wohl das Gipfeli 
aus dem Mund, Tages-Anzeiger, 18.12.2008.
In the author’s view, test case proceedings might, in 
principle, serve as a viable alternative to securities 
class actions since they provide for facilitated access 
to justice for investors, legal certainty, as well as for 
an efficient enforcement of disclosure rules without 
entailing the usual pitfalls of U.S. class actions, such 
as the hiring of “professional plaintiffs” or “races 
to the courtroom”. However, the author concludes 
that the mere “transplantation” of the German Capi-
tal Markets Test Case Act would not considerably 
improve investors’ position in Switzerland as such. 
Rather, in order to enhance investors’ access to jus-
tice, policymakers would need to contemplate a com-
prehensive reform of an array of provisions of both 
procedural and substantive law.
  * Dr. iur., LL.M., attorney-at-law. Senior Research Fellow, 
Institute for Banking Law, Berne University/Chair for 
Banking and Financial Market Law, Fribourg University.
This paper is part of a larger research project on invest-
ors’ collective redress, conducted at Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center, Washington D.C., during the academic 
year 2007/08. The author owes a special debt of gratitude 
to the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) and to 
the Foundation Professor Heinrich Kronstein for fund-
ing this project. Special thanks to Prof. Edward K. M. 
Bilich, Georgetown University Law Center, and to Sonja
M. Strahm, J.D. (University of California, Berkeley), for 
valuable comments. Remaining errors are mine. All cited 
Websites were last consulted on 15.4.2009.
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focuses on fundamental policy goals, such as judi-
cial economy, enhanced investor protection through 
facilitated access to justice, consistency and quality 
of jurisprudence, efficient enforcement of securities 
laws, as well as the respect of due process and the 
right to be heard for both plaintiffs and defendants.
As far as terminology is concerned, the overarch-
ing term “collective redress” is used throughout this 
paper in order to refer to an array of procedural mech-
anisms that allow investors to seek monetary relief 
for losses incurred.8 In order to distinguish between 
different approaches that foreign policymakers have 
taken toward investors’ collective redress, this paper 
further differentiates the subcategories “U.S.-style 
class actions”, “test cases”, “representative actions”9
and “group actions”.10
II. Approaches to Investors’ Collective 
Redress in Foreign Jurisdictions
1. United States: The Cradle of Class Action 
Litigation
The best-known but also most controversial pro-
cedural mechanism allowing for investors’ collective 
redress is the U.S. securities class action pursuant to 
U.S. FRCP Rule 23 (b)(3).11 Provided that numerosi-
ty, commonality, typicality and adequacy of represen-
tation are met,12 one or a few plaintiffs may file a law-
2005 I No. 50, 2437 ff. An unofficial English translation is 
available at <www.bmj.bund.de/kapmug>.
  8 The analysis conducted in this paper is primarily focussed 
on actions for damages in cases of civil liability for mate-
rial misstatements or omissions in prospectuses and other 
documents for public securities offerings (hereinafter: 
“deficient disclosure”).
  9 This term stands for actions filed by public interest asso-
ciations on behalf of their members (in casu: investors).
10 This term stands for litigation by a group of people, either 
based on an “opt-in” or an “opt-out” system.
11 U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter: FRCP). 
The class action system roots in the 17th century British 
Chancery jurisdiction. For an overview of the historical 
development of class action litigation, see Neil Andrews,
Multi-Party Proceedings in England: Representative and 
Group Actions, ZZPInt 5 (2000), 3 ff.
12 These general requirements for the certification of a class 
action are codified in FRCP Rule 23 (a): While the nu-
merosity standard requires that the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all parties would be impracticable (see be-
low, n. 111), the commonality element requires that “there 
are questions of law or fact common to the class”. The 
surprise that certain exponents of the plaintiffs’ bar 
are sharpening their knives.3
Is the dreaded “monster”4 on its way to conquer 
Switzerland?
One should not overreact. There is no evidence of 
U.S. style class actions striking roots in our jurisdic-
tion, contrary to regulatory trends toward collective 
litigation which can be traced worldwide.5
But Switzerland might face a serious and multi-
layered problem, given the fact that it has not yet 
tackled the issue of investors’ collective redress: In 
these times of economic downturn, it is likely that 
Swiss courts will soon be overwhelmed by a flood 
of investors’ lawsuits. Ensuring an expeditious and 
cost-efficient handling of these claims will constitute 
a tremendous challenge for the Swiss judicial system 
as, up until now, Swiss courts have gained very little 
experience dealing with large-scale securities litiga-
tion.
It has recently been argued that in order to obtain 
collective redress for the “Lehman victims”, it would, 
in principle, be possible to file a “Swiss-style” class 
action.6 This paper, for one thing, challenges this 
thesis by demonstrating the shortcomings of Switzer-
land’s current legal framework for collective redress. 
For another, and with a de lege ferenda perspective, it 
attempts to shed some light on benefits and drawbacks 
of innovative approaches that foreign policymakers 
have taken in order to enhance investors’ collective 
redress. Given the Swiss disinclination toward U.S. 
style class actions on the one hand and growing con-
cern about proper access to justice for investors on 
the other hand, this paper assesses whether test cases, 
as introduced in the 2005 German Capital Markets 
Test Case Act (KapMuG),7 could serve as a viable 
alternative to the status quo. In its analysis, the paper 
  3 On 3.1.2009, “Anleger-Selbsthilfe”, a recently founded 
investor association, announced the filing of a “Swiss-
style” class action. Beat Schmid, Lehman-Opfer bereiten 
Sammelklage gegen CS vor, Über 95 Prozent der Anlage-
Opfer erhielten keine Entschädigung, Sonntags-Zeitung,
4.1.2009.
  4 This is related to a tongue-in-cheek metaphor coined by 
Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining 
Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 
92 Harv. L. Rev. 664 (1979), 665.
  5 For details, see below II.2.
  6 Daniel Fischer, Sammelklagen: Auch in der Schweiz sinn-
voll?, plädoyer 6/2008, 48 ff., 54.
  7 “Gesetz zur Einführung von Kapitalanleger-Musterver-
fahren”, adopted on 16.8.2005, in force 1.11.2005, BGBl 
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suit not only in their own name, but also on behalf of 
a – usually large – number of other investors similarly 
situated. The ultimate resolution of the lawsuit, be it 
a court decision or a settlement, is, in principle, bind-
ing on all members of a class. Investors who prefer to 
pursue their claims individually may request exclu-
sion from the class (so-called “opt-out”).13
In securities-related matters, class actions fa-
cilitate the procedural aggregation of small claims 
enabling myriads of affected investors to seek re-
dress on the basis of economies of scale. Fostering 
procedural devices for collective redress is not only 
justified on the grounds of the small claims dilemma, 
but also by the sheer complexity of the facts and legal 
questions that are usually involved in securities liti-
gation. Thus, class actions promote judicial efficiency
and reduce the risk of inconsistent adjudications in 
the same or very similar cases.14 Lastly, since secu-
rities class actions ensure that wrongdoers are held 
accountable for illegal conduct, they positively influ-
ence the conduct of market players and they further 
enhance the proper enforcement of securities laws.15
Despite these uncontested benefits, since the early 
1990ies U.S. securities class actions have been the 
object of growing criticism. In reaction to frivolous 
“strike suits”, which included the hiring of “pro-
fessional plaintiffs”,16 or the “routine filing of law-
claims of the named plaintiff further have to be typical 
of the claims of the class (see below, n. 116) and, finally, 
class action certification is dependent on whether lead 
counsel(s) “will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class” (see below, n. 117). For details, see Robert
H. Klonoff /Edward K. M. Bilich /Suzette M. Malveaux, 
Class Actions and other Multi-Party Litigation, 2nd edition, 
St. Paul 2006, 69 ff., 83 ff., 98 ff., 117 ff.
13 Cf. FRCP Rule 23 (c)(2)(B).
14 For a discussion of benefits and drawbacks of class ac-
tions, see Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class Action Di-
lemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain, RAND 
Institute for Civil Justice, Santa Monica 2000, passim.
15 “[P]rivate securities litigation help[s] to deter wrong-
doing” and “is an indispensable tool with which defrauded 
investors can recover their losses without having to rely 
upon government action”. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
369, 31 (1995).
16 It appeared that certain law firms had instructed and even 
paid fake lead plaintiffs (so-called “strike suits”). For other
examples of abusive tactics see Michael A. Perino, Did the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, Univer-
sity of Illinois Law Review, 914 (2003), 920; Stephanie
Eichholtz, Die U.S. amerikanische Class Action und ihre 
deutschen Funktionsäquivalente, Frankfurt a.M. 2001, 
24 ff.
suits” whenever there was a “significant change in an 
issuer’s stock price”,17 the U.S. Congress passed the 
1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.18 The 
PSLRA ensures that attorneys’ fees may not be more 
than a “reasonable percentage of the amount of any 
damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to 
the class”, that settlements for securities fraud may 
not be put under seal, except for good cause shown, 
and that the lead plaintiff is the “most adequate 
plaintiff ”.19
Class actions, however, remain controversial. 
Critics have argued that class actions jeopardize in-
dividuals’ constitutional right of due process, since 
they force affected individuals to be bound by a court 
decision which did not take their specific circum-
stances into account, hereby pressurizing defend-
ants to conclude unfavourable settlements (“legal 
blackmail”).20 In fact, securities class actions in par-
ticular often fall short of proper judicial adjudica-
tion of damages as the majority of class actions are 
resolved by an out-of-court settlement before a trial 
with a full assessment of the evidence even occurs. 
It is, therefore, often not the law governing market 
players’ conduct, but the power play of the potential 
plaintiffs and their lead counsel(s).21
There are a number of alternative devices for col-
lective litigation, such as joinder, interpleader, im-
pleader or consolidation,22 and even the concept of 
17 H. R. CONF. REP. (n. 15) ibid.
18 Hereinafter: PSLRA. Cf. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995). For an overview on the reform, see Klonoff /Bilich /
Malveaux (n. 12) 1016 ff.; Joseph A. Grundfest /Michael 
A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year’s 
Experience, A Statistical and Legal Analysis of Class 
Action Securities Fraud Litigation under the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (<http://ssrn.com/
abstract=10582>).
19 Cf. 15 U.S.C §§ 77z-1(3)(B); 78u-4(3)(B); 78u-4(a)(6) f.
A rebuttable presumption assumes that the person with the 
“largest financial interest in the relief sought” can most ad-
equately represent the class as lead plaintiff. Persons who 
have acted as lead plaintiffs in five different cases in the 
preceding three years are excluded.
20 International Chamber of Commerce, Policy Statement on 
Class action litigation, 1.12.2005, 2 f. (<www.iccwbo.org/
uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/clp/Statements/Class_action
_litigation.pdf>).
21 Burkhard Hess, Sammelklagen im Kapitalmarktrecht, 
AG 3/2003, 113 ff., at 116, speaks of “bargaining in the 
shadow of the law”. On this issue, see further Stephanie
Eichholtz (n. 16) 180 ff.
22 For an assessment of these procedural devices, see 
Klonoff /Bilich /Malveaux (n. 12) 1125 ff.
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test cases is known in the U.S.23 Still, the class ac-
tion under FRCP Rule 23 (b)(3) clearly is the most 
developed and powerful procedural mechanism for 
large-scale securities litigation.
2. Class Actions as Globalizing 
“Legal Transplants”
Are class actions really going global, as headlines 
in journals currently suggest?24 In fact, while respec-
tive regulatory trends can be traced worldwide,25 the 
“class action pandemic” proved to be particularly 
infectious in Europe.26 This is particularly surpris-
ing as the deep-rooted civil law traditions have long 
been fundamentally adverse to collective litigation. 
This remarkable regulatory trend has been reinforced 
by the fact that legal services which are intricately 
linked with collective litigation, such as plaintiffs’ 
bars and third party litigation funds, are increasingly 
being offered in Europe, be it through established 
European law firms or by specialized U.S. class ac-
tion law firms moving to Europe.27
2.1 EU Initiatives
“I do not have in mind the United States type of class 
action. This is not a John Grisham story. We have another, 
European narrative, and this is much more related to col-
lective redress.”28
Improving collective redress for consumers in 
terms of access, effectiveness, as well as affordabil-
ity is one of the main goals of the EU Commissions’ 
23 See below, IV.1.
24 See John J. Clarke Jr. /Keara M. Gordon, Global Realm 
of Securities Class Actions, As U.S. Courts Grapple With 
Jurisdiction over Foreign Investors’ Claims, Other Coun-
tries Adopt Elements Similar to American Model, New 
York Law Journal, 19.5.2008, 1 ff. The metaphor of “legal 
transplants” is taken from Alan Watson, Legal Transplants, 
1st Edition, Edinburgh 1974.
25 For an overview, see the collection of country reports on 
the website “Global Class Actions Exchange” hosted by 
Professor Deborah Hensler of Stanford Law School (<http
://globalclassactions.stanford.edu.html>).
26 See below, II.2.2.
27 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Class Actions and third 
Party Funding of Litigation – an Analysis across Europe,
June 2007, 1 (<www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/
2007/jun18/18825.pdf>).
28 Meglena Kuneva, Commissioner for Consumer Protection, 
speech before the EU Parliament on 13.3.2007, 8 (<http://
ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kuneva/speeches/ver
batim_transcr_speech13032007_en.pdf>).
2007–2013 Consumer Policy Strategy.29 The initia-
tive covers areas, such as telecommunications, trans-
portation and financial services.30
Based on extensive research conducted by expert 
groups,31 in November 2008, the EU Commission 
published a Green Paper on Consumer Collective 
Redress.32 In its Green Paper, the EU Commission 
put several options to debate. They range from taking 
no immediate action to enhance cooperation between 
member states, to implementing mixed policy instru-
ments, such as, e.g., alternative dispute resolution 
schemes or small claims procedures, to adopting – 
binding or non-binding – measures providing for a 
judicial collective redress procedure in all EU mem-
ber states.33 Given the breadth of this range and the 
uncertainty, whether the EU even has jurisdictional 
competence to introduce harmonized legislation with 
regard to collective redress,34 the future of EU-wide 
standards for collective consumer redress, therefore, 
remain in the dark.
29 COM (2007) 99, 13.3.2007 (<http://ec.europa.eu/consum
ers/overview/cons_policy/doc/EN_99.pdf>).
30 A Study had found that, compared to other sectors, con-
sumers find it most difficult to obtain collective redress 
in the financial services sector. See Green Paper (below 
n. 32) 4.
31 The Commission had, for this purpose, mandated several 
expert groups. See Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Study 
Centre for Consumer Law/Centre for European Economic 
Law, An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of 
consumer redress other than redress through ordinary 
judicial proceedings, 17.1.2007 (<http://ec.europa.eu/con
sumers/redress/reports_studies/comparative_report_en.
pdf>; hereinafter: Leuven Report); Civic Consulting/
Oxford Economics, Evaluation of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the Euro-
pean Union, 26.8.2008 (<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
redress_cons/finalreportevaluation-studypart1-final
2008-11-26.pdf>; hereinafter: Civic Report).
32 Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM 
(2008) 794, 27.11.2008 (<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm>).
33 Green Paper (n. 32) 7 ff., 12 ff.
34 Peter Mattil /Vanessa Desoutter, Die europäische Sammel-
klage, WM 2008 521 ff., 525, assume that arts. 61 and 65 
of the European Community Treaty (ECT) could serve as 
a legal basis for introducing EU-wide mechanisms for col-
lective redress.
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2.2 National Initiatives in Europe
As a reaction to major corporate scandals, such 
as Parmalat35, Royal Dutch Shell36 and Deutsche 
Telekom37, a considerable number of policymakers 
in Europe chose to introduce new mechanisms for 
collective redress.38 The following reforms are par-
ticularly noteworthy, since they are also applicable to
investors’ claims for damages:
− In France39 and Spain40, investors’ associations 
have standing to file lawsuits for damages on be-
half of their members. Individual investors are, 
however, only bound by the outcome of these rep-
resentative actions if they explicitly declared to 
“opt-in” to the lawsuits filed by the associations.
− Since 1999, Portugal provides for “opt-out” style
group actions for investors’ claims for damages.41
35 In December 2003, the Italian dairy company Parmalat 
Finanziaria SpA collapsed with EUR 14.4 billion in debt. 
More than 130000 bondholders, among them a large per-
centage of retail investors, lost out.
36 From 1997 to 2003, Royal Dutch Shell Plc. had inflated 
its oil and gas reserves, which led to a dramatic fall in its 
share price when the overstatement was corrected in 2004. 
In April 2007, more than 90 pension and investment funds 
settled with Royal Dutch Shell Plc. for USD 352.6 mil-
lion under a new Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass 
Claims adopted in the Netherlands in 2005. For further 
details, see below, n. 46.
37 In a series of filings, over 16 000 plaintiffs, represented 
by more than 700 counsels, alleged that prospectuses 
published in connection with a raise of share capital of 
Deutsche Telekom contained misrepresentations of mate-
rial fact. The alleged misstatements concerned the issuer’s 
real estate properties (1999 prospectus) and the acquisi-
tion of the U.S. telephone provider VoiceStream (2000 
prospectus). The case is regarded as one of the main fac-
tors triggering the adoption of the KapMuG in Germany. 
For further details, see below IV.2.
38 For an overview, see Leuven Report (n. 31) 270–277; Civic
Report (n. 31) 174–179; Mattil /Desoutter (n. 34) 521 ff.
39 French Code monétaire et financier art. L 452-2, adopt-
ed 8.8.1994. For details, see Véronique Magnier, Class
Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective 
Litigation, 8 ff. (<www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/
dynamic/events_media/France_National_Report.pdf>).
40 “Ley de enjuiciameniento civil” arts. 11, 15 and 221, 
adopted in 2001. See Manuel Ortells Ramos, Der neue 
spanische Zivilprozess, 5 ZZPInt (2000), 95 ff.; Mattil /
Desoutter (n. 34) 524.
41 “Acção Popular” (Act 83/95, Sect. 14 f.) approved by 
Decree-Law 486/99 of 13.11.1999, in connection with 
Portuguese Securities Code Sect. 31 f. For further details, 
see Henrique Sousa Antunes, Class Actions, Group Litiga-
tion & Other Forms of Collective Litigation (<www.law.
stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Por
tugal_National_Report.pdf>).
Investors’ associations or retail investors acting 
as lead plaintiffs have standing to file an action 
for damages, which deploys binding effect on all 
investors similarly situated, unless they have de-
clared an “opt-out”.
− The United Kingdom introduced group actions in 
2000.42 The court renders a judgment on a repre-
sentative case in order to determine common or 
related issues of fact or law, which deploys bind-
ing effect on all claims that have previously been 
registered with the court trying the representative 
case. Plaintiffs are, however, required to “opt-in”
to the action.
− After almost ten years of legislative work, Sweden
finally adopted group actions in 2003.43 Despite 
its “opt-in” style, commentators have found that 
the effect of the Swedish group actions came very 
close to U.S. class actions.44 The Swedish group 
action is not restricted to certain areas of law and, 
hence, may be used for investors’ collective re-
dress.
− In Germany, investors may apply for an abstract 
ruling on questions of fact or law common to a 
multitude of claimants (test case proceedings). 
This new procedural device was introduced 
with the 2005 Capital Markets Test Case Act 
(KapMuG).45
− In 2005, the Netherlands adopted new rules which 
provide for court-approved settlements for mass 
claims.46 These out-of-court settlements negoti-
ated by investors’ associations deploy binding ef-
fect on all investors similarly situated, except for 
those who explicitly declared an “opt-out”.
− Denmark has recently adopted a set of procedural 
rules introducing different forms of group litiga-
42 Civil Procedure Rules adopted in 1998, Rule 19 Sect. III.
For further details, see Andrews (n. 11) 3 ff.; Hans-W. 
Micklitz /Astrid Stadler, The Development of Collective 
Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Pro-
cedure, EBLR 2006 1473, 1488 ff.
43 “Lag em grupeprättegång”, SFS 2002: 599, effective as of 
1.1.2003. For further details, see Mattil /Desoutter (n. 34)
523.
44 Micklitz / Stadler (n. 42) 1493 ff.
45 For an in-depth assessment, see below IV.
46 “Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade” adopted in 
October 2004. The Act led to respective supplements of 
the Dutch Civil Code (art. 907–910 “Burgerlijk Wetboek”) 
and the Rules of Civil Procedure (art. 1013–1018 “Wet-
boek van Burgerlijke Recthsvordering”). For details, see 
Micklitz / Stadler (n. 42) 1490 ff.
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tion, which entered into force in January 2008.47
The new Act provides for both “opt-in” and – in 
the case of small-claims issues – “opt-out” style
group actions. In “opt-out” style actions, which 
apply to securities litigation, the class may not be 
represented by a private plaintiff, but only by a 
designated public authority, such as the Danish 
consumer ombudsman.
− On 1 January 2009, Italy introduced the “azione 
collettiva risarcitoria”, an “opt-in” style repre-
sentative action.48 Standing to bring suit is re-
served to accredited consumer associations with 
a nationwide presence. In order to be entitled to 
their share of damages awarded by the court, af-
fected investors have to “opt in” to the action. Ac-
tions for damages can, among others, be brought 
for breaches of contract or unfair trade practices 
in banking and financial services.
Overall, this trend toward collective redress in 
Europe is certainly impressive, especially, consider-
ing the relatively short time span during which all 
these reforms occurred. Still, as long as the funda-
mental “transatlantic discrepancies” regarding attor-
neys’ fees,49 costs,50 damages51 and the characteristic 
features of civil procedure52 remain in place, we will 
47 Securities Trading Act Sect. 3; Act on Financial Activities 
Sect. 348; Investment Association Act Sect. 120. For fur-
ther details, see Erik Werlauff, Class Actions in Denmark, 
The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals of the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 622, 
March 2009, 202 ff.
48 “Legge 24 Dicembre 2007 no. 244”, introducing a new 
Art. 140bis into the “Codice del Consumo”. For further 
details, see Elisabetta Silvestri, The Italian “Collective 
Action for Damages”: An Update (<http://globalclass-
ations.stanford.edu/PDF/Italian_Collective_Action_for_
Damages.pdf>).
49 While contingency fees are still not allowed in most Euro-
pean jurisdictions, certain liberalizing trends could recent-
ly be observed in England, Sweden and Spain. For further 
details, see Civic Report (n. 31) 46; Mattil /Desoutter
(n. 34) 526.
50 According to the U.S. system, as a general rule, each party 
must pay its own costs, no matter the outcome of the dis-
pute (“American Rule”). In most European jurisdictions, 
costs are allocated according to the “loser pays-principle” 
(“English Rule”). Civic Report (n. 31) 4, 10, 59.
51 To date, European jurisdictions only allow plaintiffs to 
recover their actual damage. The imposition of punitive 
damages is alien to the European legal tradition. Civic Re-
port (n. 31) 78.
52 Typical plaintiff-friendly features of U.S. civil procedure 
are the jury system, which is infamous for both its un-
not see the U.S. “monster” penetrate the “quiet Euro-
pean legal gardens”.53
III. The Current Situation in Switzerland
1. A Strong Disinclination Toward Class Actions
“It is alien to European legal thought to allow some-
body to exercise rights on behalf of a vast number of people
who themselves do not participate in a law-suit. [...] the 
class action is controversial even in its country of origin, 
the U.S., [...] due to its high potential of abuse. The sums 
sued for are usually enormous, so that the defendants have 
no other choice than to give in, if they do not want to face 
sudden over-indebtedness and insolvency (so-called legal 
blackmail)”.54
The Swiss lawmakers and the public at large have 
always had a deep-rooted disinclination toward class 
predictability, the exorbitant sums of punitive damages 
awarded and broad pre-trial discovery, which potentially 
permits extensive “fishing expeditions”. There are, how-
ever, increasing tendencies toward capping punitive 
damages. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Campbell, the United States Supreme Court 
articulated constitutional limits on the imposition of puni-
tive damages, stating that “few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages 
[…] will satisfy due process”, Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003), at 425. Moreover, limiting punitive damages in 
securities class actions is among the postulates brought 
forward in the context of the intense lobbying campaign 
for sustaining the U.S. capital market’s international com-
petitiveness (see e.g., a joint report released by Republican 
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Democrat-
ic New York Senator Charles Schumer, “Sustaining New 
York’s and the U.S.’s Global Financial Services Leader-
ship”, of 22.1.2007, available at <www.nyc.gov/html/om/
pdf/ny_report_final.pdf>, especially at 21).
53 Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on Group Litigation in 
Comparative Perspective, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. 405 
(2001) 414. See further, Hess (n. 21) 116; Peter Kurer,
America: The Legal Nation, IFLR, January 2007, 34 ff., 
36: “This brings me to my final question: Is the U.S. legal 
system exportable? Will we soon see class actions, em-
powerment of plaintiffs, runaway juries, and rich plaintiff 
bar lawyers around the globe? Frankly I do not believe it. 
[…] the U.S. legal system and the quality of its legal pro-
fession are so much a part of the history, the heritage, the 
culture of the country that its power and success cannot 
be easily replicated in other places. So, when it comes to 
export, the U.S. legal system ultimately is more General 
Motors than Microsoft, more Brooks Brothers than Coca-
Cola”.
54 Swiss Government Message to Parliament regarding the 
adoption of the first Federal Code of Civil Procedure, 
BBl 2006 7221 ff., 7290 (author’s own translation).
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actions.55 The Swiss prefer to regulate market con-
duct through legislation, meaningly, through (self) 
regulation, rather than to place responsibility for the 
enforcement of the law in the hands of private plain-
tiffs. This system is likely to stay in place, as there is 
no convincing evidence yet for a growing tendency 
toward “Adversarial Legalism”56 in Switzerland.57
The few attempts that have been made to intro-
duce class actions to Swiss law have always met with 
strong opposition on the political level.58 Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise that class actions were not even 
taken into consideration in the course of drafting 
the first Federal Code of Civil Procedure (FCCP).59
55 Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litiga-
tion in Switzerland, 27 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 301 (2007), 
309 ff., suspects that the Swiss’ disinclination toward U.S. 
class actions is in part attributable to the Holocaust Assets 
class action filed against Swiss banks in the late 1990ies. 
Another explanation are the widespread misgivings about 
an increasing “Americanization” of Swiss law. On this 
subject, see Wolfgang Wiegand, Die Rezeption amerika-
nischen Rechts, in: Festgabe zum Schweizerischen Juris-
tentag 1988, Bern 1988, 229 ff. Moreover, there was never 
enough social pressure to introduce class actions in Swit-
zerland since comprehensive social and private insurance 
schemes provide for adequate redress in tort related mat-
ters.
56 The term of art “Adversarial Legalism” stands for the sui
generis approach which Americans take toward the en-
forcement of public policy goals through litigation as well 
as for the prominent role of the judiciary vis-à-vis the le-
gislature. See Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and 
American Government, 10 Journal of Policy Analysis & 
Management 369 (1991), especially at 373.
57 For an in-depth analysis, see Regina Kiener /Raphael
Lanz, Amerikanisierung des schweizerischen Rechts – und 
ihre Grenzen, “Adversarial Legalism” und schweizerische 
Rechtsordnung, ZSR 119 (2000) I, 155 ff., 160, 165 ff. On 
the contrary, some scholars claim to observe an increas-
ing tendency toward “Adversarial Legalism” in several 
European civil law jurisdictions. See e.g., R. Daniel Kele-
men, Suing for Europe, Adversarial Legalism and Euro-
pean Governance, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 39,
No. 1, February 2006, 101 ff.
58 A parliamentary motion that called for the introduction of 
class actions for consumer disputes as well as for labor 
and tenancy law disputes was abandoned in October 2000 
(parliamentary motion No. 98.3401, filed by National 
Councillor Erwin Jutzet), and a tort law reform project 
which provided for group litigation for mass torts was 
dropped from the political agenda in 2009 (see Federal 
Council media release of 21.1.2009).
59 Upon its entry into force on 1.1.2011, the FCCP will re-
place the 26 cantonal Codes of Civil Procedure by one 
harmonized set of rules. Both the group of experts and the 
Federal Government in its message to Parliament (n. 54)
had advised against introducing class actions in Swiss law. 
Scholars have, however, recurringly called for im-
proving collective redress in Swiss law.60
When it comes to justifying their refusal to in-
troduce class actions, Swiss lawmakers usually refer 
to the existence of alternative procedural devices for 
collective claims, such as joinder,61 consolidation, 
public interests association suits as well as actions 
filed by public interest associations62 and they fur-
ther emphasize the significant role that government 
agencies assume in law enforcement.
But does our current legal framework deliver 
when it comes to investors’ collective redress?
2. The Framework for the Enforcement 
of Securities Laws
The lion’s share of enforcement proceedings on 
the grounds of alleged violations of Federal Securi-
ties Laws is brought ex officio by the Swiss Financial 
In the parliamentary debate, this position remained uncon-
tested (see, e.g., the statement of State Councillor Franz 
Wicki, made on behalf of the advisory commission, Amtl-
Bull 2007 SR 499). See also, Martin Bernet, Kommen die 
Sammelklagen nach Europa? Für die Schweiz steht eine 
einheitliche Zivilprozessordnung im Vordergrund, NZZ, 
22.11.2006, 29.
60 Baumgartner (n. 55) 315; Alexander Brunner, Zur Ver-
bands- und Sammelklage in der Schweiz, in: Hans Ulrich 
Walder-Richli, Rechtsschutz im Privatrecht, Symposium 
für Richard Frank, Zürich 2003, 37 ff., 38; Isabelle Romy,
Litiges de masse – des class actions aux solutions suisses
dans les cas de pollutions et de toxiques, Habil., Fribourg 
1997, 235 ff.
61 All cantonal civil procedure codes and FCCP art. 70
(n. 59) allow for permissive joinder of parties based on 
substantially similar factual or legal claims. Art. 7 I of 
the Federal Act on Jurisdiction in Civil Matters provides 
for a common venue for these claims. Given the fact that 
plaintiffs may file procedural motions independently from 
each other (FCCP art. 70 III), permissive joinder hardly 
ever results in an effective pooling of claims and, hence, 
usually brings about only limited benefits in terms of judi-
cial economy.
62 These procedural devices are not further discussed here, 
as legal scholarship has already extensively commented 
on them. See, e.g., Baumgartner (n. 55) 316 ff.; Samuel P. 
Baumgartner, Class Actions in der Schweiz?, Ansätze für 
eine nutzbringende Verwendung vergleichender Betrach-
tung des U.S.-amerikanischen Prozessrechts, in: Benjamin 
Schindler /Regula Schlauri, Auf dem Weg zu einem ein-
heitlichen Verfahrensrecht, Zürich 2001, 111 ff.; Brun-
ner (n. 60) 37 ff.; Gerhard Walter, Mass tort Litigation in 
Germany and Switzerland, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. 369
(2001), 373 ff.; Hans Peter Walter, Prozessuale Aspekte 
beim Streit zwischen Kunde und Vermögensverwalter, 
ZSR 127 (2008) I, 99 ff., 122 ff.
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Market Supervisory Authority.63 In order to ensure 
compliance with the law, the FINMA may open en-
forcement proceedings against all financial services 
providers subject to its supervision, including banks, 
securities dealers, management companies of col-
lective investment schemes and insurance compa-
nies (FINMASA art. 3). However, these proceedings 
are purely administrative in nature and they are not 
designed to award damages to individual investors. 
The FINMA may compensate affected investors by 
means of a confiscation of illegitimately made profits
(FINMASA art. 35 VI).64 In order to receive such 
compensation, an affected investor must first have 
obtained final civil judgment or a settlement award-
ing damages.65
While Swiss law contains a vast number of provi-
sions entitling investors to file actions for damages,66
only a handful deserve special attention in order to as-
sess investors’ options of seeking collective redress:
– Pursuant to CO art. 1157, bondholders form a 
community ipso iure, which is usually represent-
ed by a trustee according to CO art. 1158. How-
ever, neither the community of bondholders nor 
63 The new Financial Market Supervisory Authority (herein-
after: FINMA) assumes the task of overseeing the various 
exponents of the financial services industry pursuant to the 
Federal Act on Financial Market Supervision of 22.6.2007 
(SR 956.1; hereinafter: FINMASA). For a comprehensive 
overview of financial market law enforcement in Switzer-
land, see Urs Zulauf /David Wyss /Daniel Roth, Finanz-
marktenforcement, Bern 2008.
64 For further details, see Jean-Baptiste Zufferey /Franca 
Contratto, FINMA – The Authority for Financial Market 
Supervision in Switzerland, Basel/Genf/München 2009, 
Chapter 15, IV.1.
65 Federal Council Message of 1.2.2006 on the Federal Act 
on the Financial Market Supervisory Act (FINMASA), 
BBl 2007 2829 ff., 2884. Jurisdiction for awarding dam-
ages for civil liability is reserved to civil courts established 
under Swiss Federal Constitution art. 122.
66 The most important of these provisions are arts. 752 ff. of 
the Swiss Code of Obligations (hereinafter: CO), which 
notably provide for directors’ and officers’ liability as well 
as for liability for misstatements or omissions of material 
facts in a securities prospectus issued by a corporation; 
CO art. 1156 III, pursuant to which bondholders are en-
titled to file an action on grounds of misrepresentations in a 
prospectus; art. 145 of the Collective Investment Schemes 
Act of 23.6.2007, SR 951.31 (hereinafter: CISA), which 
empowers investors in collective investment schemes to 
file actions for damages for any breach of duties set forth 
under the CISA; and finally, art. 39 of the Banking Act of 
8.11.1934, SR 952.0 (hereinafter BA), which is applicable 
to investors’ actions for damages filed against a bank.
the trustee has standing to file an action for pro-
spectus liability based on CO art. 1156 III.67 The 
ratio legis behind CO arts. 1157 ff. is not to en-
hance individual bondholders’ redress, but rather 
to prevent minority bondholders from impeding 
measures that are necessary for a timely financial 
restructuring of the debtor.68
– CISA art. 86 I entitles investors in open-ended 
collective investment schemes to make a petition 
to the court asking for the appointment of a repre-
sentative. Based on CISA art. 145, the representa-
tive is, among other things, entitled to file actions 
for damages due to deficient disclosure in a pro-
spectus.69 As a rule, damages may not be awarded 
to individual investors, but only to the open-ended 
collective investment scheme (CISA art. 86 IV).70
– MA art. 10571 provides for collective redress for 
minority shareholders who incurred losses due to 
disadvantageous treatment in a merger transac-
tion. An affirmative judgment awarding a com-
pensation payment deploys erga omnes effect on 
all shareholders similarly situated. A judgment 
denying such compensation does not, however, 
deploy res judicata effect on other affected minor-
ity shareholders.72
Moreover, there is no general provision in Swiss 
federal securities law, which provides for represen-
tative actions by means of which investors’ associa-
tions could file actions for damages on behalf of in-
dividual investors.73 In conclusion, outside the rather 
67 BGE 113 II 283 ff., 289 c. 5; BSK-Steinmann /Reutter,
N 2 ad CO art. 1164.
68 CR CO II-Jean-Baptiste Zufferey, N 8 ad CO art. 1164.
69 Franz Hasenböhler (ed.), Recht der kollektiven Kapital-
anlagen, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2007, 251.
70 A different approach may, however, be justified if a plain-
tiff has already redeemed his holdings. See BGE 132 III
189, especially c. 6 at 198 ff. (the case was, however, de-
cided under the Investment Fund Act of 14.3.1994).
71 Federal Act on Merger, Demerger, Conversion and Trans-
fer of Assets and Liabilities Mergers of 3.10.2003, SR 
221.301 (hereinafter: MA).
72 For further details, see Karin Eugster, Die Überprüfung 
der Anteils- und Mitgliedschaftsrechte nach Art. 105
FusG, Diss. Zürich 2006, 181; Daniel Emch, System des 
Rechtsschutzes im Fusionsgesetz, Diss. Bern 2006, 161 ff.
73 Brunner (n. 60) 42 ff. It is important to note that in any case 
the remedies that public interest associations may seek are 
limited. Public interest associations may only seek injunc-
tive relief or the rendering of a declaratory judgment, but 
they are not entitled to claim damages on behalf of their 
members. This principle is valid for all areas of Swiss law 
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narrow scope of application of CISA art. 86 and MA 
art. 105, investors’ collective claims for damages can 
currently only be dealt with by resorting to the tradi-
tional and rather inefficient procedural devices, i.e., 
permissive joinder or consolidation of separate ac-
tions in a single proceeding.74
Investors’ position in Swiss law is further aggra-
vated due to the fact that substantive law imposes 
a very high burden of proof on plaintiffs, especially 
with regard to proof of reliance and loss causation
in cases for civil liability for deficient disclosure 
(“prospectus liability”). To date, the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court has always refused to alleviate the 
burden of proof based on the “fraud-on-the-market-
theory”.75
It is important to note that the majority of “Leh-
man victims” may not be able to successfully bring 
a lawsuit based on liability for deficient disclosure 
in a prospectus. More likely, these investors’ lawsuits 
will have to be based on breaches of duties related to 
asset management under an investment advisory con-
tract, and it will be an extremely challenging task to 
convince the court of the commonality of an array of 
investors’ claims. Therefore, the chances that a court 
will allow voluntary joinder are very slim.
and will be reflected in FCCP art. 87 II, effective as of 
1.1.2011. See Government Message (n. 54) 7289 ff.
74 Daniel R. Bläuer, Rechtsausübung durch Gläubigergrup-
pen, Diss. Luzern 2007, 124 ff.
75 Most recently, see BGE 132 III 715 ff. (Miracle Hold-
ing). For comments, see Catherine Chammartin /Hans
Caspar von der Crone, Kausalität in der Prospekthaftung, 
SZW/RSDA 6/2006, 452 ff.; Markus Felber, Verneinte 
Prospekthaftung im Fall “Miracle”, Jusletter 16.10.2006
(<http://jusletter.weblaw.ch/article/de/_5081?lang=de>). 
The “fraud-on-the-market” theory is based on the hypoth-
esis that in an efficient securities market the price of a se-
curity is determined by the information available. Since 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), 241–249, 
instead of requiring plaintiffs to show direct reliance on 
false or misleading statements, the U.S. Supreme Court 
supports a rebuttable presumption of reliance if the com-
pany’s securities were traded on an efficient market. A 
stricter pleading standard is, however, required for loss 
causation: Plaintiffs are required to prove a causal link 
between the defendants’ alleged misrepresentation and 
a subsequent decline in the value of the share price, Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al. v. Broudo et al., 544 U.S. 336 
2005.
IV.   Test Cases in the Design of the KapMuG
1. Experiences with Test Cases in Various 
Jurisdictions
It has become fashionable to praise test cases as 
the panacea against the lacking access to justice for 
investors under Swiss law.76 Test cases are usually 
rendered subsequent to an extra-judicial agreement 
between plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) to accept the 
outcome of a single case as binding upon a plurality 
of other cases similarly situated. A judgment in a test 
case does not, however, deploy res judicata effect on 
claimants who were not formally parties of a case.77
Test cases have been known both in the U.S.78 and 
in several European jurisdictions, such as Austria,79
Germany80 and Switzerland.81 Due to their obvious 
shortcomings, they have always lived in the shadows 
of other, more powerful devices for large scale-liti-
gation.
76 See e.g., Fischer (n. 6) 54 f.; Bruno Schletti, In den U.S.A. 
hätte die Credit Suisse viel mehr Angst, Tages-Anzeiger, 
19.11.2008.
77 Baumgartner (n. 55) 342 ff.; Baumgartner (n. 62) 123; 
Bläuer (n. 74) 119 ff.; Gerhard Walter (n. 62) 374; Hans
Peter Walter (n. 62) 125. Micklitz / Stadler (n. 42) 1479, 
however, speak of a test cases as setting a “virtual prece-
dent”.
78 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3rd Cir. 1974);
In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, 720
F. Supp. 1505 (D. Colo. 1989); In re Am. Honda Motor 
Co., Inc. Dealer Relations Litig., 979 F.Supp. 365 (D. Md.
1997). On the practical impact of test cases, see Edward 
F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives 
and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 Re-
view of Litigation 691 (2006), 696 ff.
79 Austrian Code of Civil Procedure § 502 allows consumer 
associations to bring a test case. It is, however, of no fur-
ther interest in the present context, as no monetary dam-
ages for individual claimants may be sought. For details, 
see Leuven Report (n. 31) 277.
80 For an overview on the development in Germany, see 
Micklitz / Stadler (n. 42) 1478 ff.
81 In Switzerland, there is currently no law that allows mass 
litigation to be handled through a test case. Hence, up 
until now, only a handful of test cases have been tried 
before Swiss courts and none of them concerned inves-
tors’ claims for damages. The first ever reported test case 
treated claims of Swiss farmers who had incurred eco-
nomic losses in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear 
catastrophe (BGE 116 II 480 ff.). For further details, see 
Baumgartner (n. 55) 343 n. 293; Gerhard Walter (n. 62)
374.
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2. The KapMuG: A Short Portrait
2.1 Legislative Background
With the adoption of the Capital Markets Test 
Case Act (KapMuG)82 in 2005, Germany chose to 
introduce a modernized version of test cases spe-
cifically designed for investors’ collective redress. 
The KapMuG was adopted with the primary goal 
of enhancing judicial economy in large-scale secur-
ities litigation and has to be seen as a reaction to the 
Deutsche Telekom case, one of the largest lawsuits in 
Germany’s history.83
The KapMuG has only been adopted for an ini-
tial trial period of five years and it will automatically 
cease to have effect on 1.11.2010, unless the German 
legislature decides to prolong it (KapMuG art. 9 II).
It is likely that the KapMuG will remain in force, 
although most probably with certain amendments.84
Over the past few years, the new test case proceeding 
has already been applied to a number of cases, among 
82 For specific reference, see above, n. 7.
83 For further details on this case, see above n. 37. The case 
considerably contributed to the forming of the political 
commitment to create a new procedural device for invest-
ors’ collective redress. Therefore, the KapMuG is often 
also referred to as “Lex Telekom”. For an overview of the 
legislative history, see Christian Duve /Tanja V. Pfitzner,
Braucht der Kapitalmarkt ein neues Gesetz für Massen-
verfahren?, BB 2005 673 ff.; Christoph Keller /Annabella 
Kolling, Das Gesetz zur Einführung von Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahren – Ein Überblick, BKR 10/2005, 399 ff.; 
Thomas M. J. Möllers /Tilman Weichert, Das Kapitalan-
leger-Musterverfahrensgesetz, NJW 2005, 2737 ff.; Fa-
bian Reuschle, Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensge-
setz – ein neuer Weg zur prozessualen Bewältigung von 
Massenschäden auf dem Kapitalmarkt, Österreichisches 
Anwaltsblatt 2006/07, 371 ff.
84 While some scholars postulate the introduction to test case 
proceedings for other areas susceptible for mass litigation 
(see e.g., Reuschle [n. 83] 382), others have questioned the 
expediency of the test case proceeding in its current set-
up and, therefore, have suggested major amendments. For 
further details, see below, IV.4.1.
them the three large-scale cases Deutsche Telekom,85
Infomatec86 and DaimlerChrysler.87
2.2 Limited Scope
The scope of the KapMuG is limited to invest-
ors’ claims for damages due to false, misleading or 
omitted public capital markets information.88 Other 
claims for redress, such as actions for damages based 
on alleged breaches of duties of an investment ad-
visory contract do not fall under its scope of appli-
cation.89
A test case ruling is not designed to award dam-
ages to individual investors. Rather, it is a declara-
tory judgment rendered to clarify common questions 
of fact or law with binding effect for a multitude of 
similar lawsuits (KapMuG § 1 I). Typically, a test 
case ruling will treat several intricately linked ques-
tions, such as, (1) whether specific information was 
material, (2) whether this information was wrong or 
misleading, and (3) whether defendants knew this in-
formation was deficient.90 Due to its significance for 
myriads of claims, jurisdiction to render a test case 
85 More than seven years after its initial filing, the Deutsche 
Telekom case (see above, n. 37) remains pending. See 
Joachim Jahn, Der Telekom-Prozess: Stresstest für das 
KapMuG, ZIP 29/2008, 1314 ff., 1315.
86 In Infomatec, investors had filed petitions for a test case 
ruling concerning a now insolvent technology-corporation 
which was formerly listed on the New Market segment of 
the German Stock Exchange. In their filings, the invest-
ors asserted that several of Infomatec’s releases on future 
material contracts contained material misstatements. See 
Oberlandesgericht (hereinafter: OLG) München, decision 
of 9.2.2007, 28 ZIP 649 (2007); reversed by the German 
Supreme Court (hereinafter: BGH), decision of 21.4.2008, 
II ZB 6/07, ZIP 2008, 137.
87 In DaimlerChrysler, the court was called to decide whether 
or not DaimlerChrysler had failed to timely communi-
cate the retirement of its former CEO, Jürgen Schrempp, 
whose departure came as a complete surprise to the mar-
ket and lead to a euphoric increase of DaimlerChrysler’s 
share price. See OLG Stuttgart, decision of 15.2.2007, 901 
Kap 1/06, reversed by the BGH, decision of 28.2.2008, 
II ZB 9/07.
88 The non-exhaustive list in KapMuG § 1 I mentions pro-
spectuses, communications of insider information, pre-
sentations, annual financial statements, annual reports, 
interim reports and offering documents.
89 BGH, decision of 30.10.2008, III ZB 92/07.
90 According to Jahn (n. 85) 1315, the referring order in In-
fomatec (see above, n. 86) contained no less than 33 com-
mon questions of fact or law to be ruled on by the Higher 
Regional Court (“Oberlandesgericht”, OLG).
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ruling lies not with the trial courts, but with the next-
higher regional appellate courts.91
3. The Three Phases of a Test Case Proceeding
3.1 Trial Court: Approval of Petitions for a Test Case 
Ruling
Proceedings are initiated with the filing of a peti-
tion for a test case ruling in a pending case before 
a trial court.92 A petition may be filed by either the 
plaintiff or the defendant; a test case ruling may not 
be initiated on the court’s own motion.93 Upon assess-
ment of the admissibility,94 the trial court publishes 
approved petitions in an electronic registry.95 Provided 
that a minimum of ten petitions are duly registered,96
the trial court issues a referring order to the Higher 
91 Hereinafter: Higher Regional Court. For claims in connec-
tion with deficient disclosure, the trial court usually is a 
“Landgericht”, i.e. the ordinary civil court for amounts in 
controversy exceeding EUR 5000.–. For domestic issuers, 
the issuer’s statutory seat serves as exclusive venue (cf. 
German Code of Civil Procedure § 32b). Overall, there 
are 24 “Oberlandesgerichte”, as opposed to 116 “Land-
gerichte”.
92 For a brief overview on these three phases, see Duve /
Pfitzner (n. 83) 674 f.; Keller /Kolling (n. 83) 401 f.
93 Dietmar Baetge, Class Actions, Group Litigation and 
Other Forms of Collective Litigation, National Report 
Germany, 15 (<www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dy
namic/events_media/Germany_National_Report.pdf>).
94 The decision of the trial court approving a petition for 
a test case ruling may not be appealed (KapMuG § 4 I [2]).
The court’s discretion is, however, limited by the statute 
(KapMuG § 1 III). While the KapMuG remains silent as 
to whether a court decision dismissing a petition for a test 
case ruling can be appealed or not, this has recently been 
affirmed by the BGH in Infomatec (see above n. 86). See 
also Möllers /Weichert (n. 83) 2737, 2739.
95 Cf. <www.ebundesanzeiger.de>. Due to this registration 
requirement for claims, there is a certain resemblance be-
tween UK group litigation proceedings and test case pro-
ceedings as provided for in the KapMuG. Keller /Kolling 
(n. 83) 400; Reuschle (n. 83) 375. On UK group litigation, 
see above n. 42.
96 Pursuant to KapMuG § 4 I (2), the threshold has to be met 
within four months of the publication of the first petition 
in the electronic registry. The courts have interpreted the 
statute very strictly. In Infomatec, only five petitions had 
been published in the electronic registry; however, each 
of them was filed by a multitude of investors unified by 
joinder. Based on a narrow interpretation of KapMuG 
§ 4 I (2), the Landgericht Augsburg, where the petitions 
had been filed, refused to issue a referring order. On ap-
peal, this decision was confirmed by the OLG München, 
but was finally reversed by the BGH (for references, see 
above n. 86).
Regional Court. In its order, the trial court defines the 
common questions of law or fact to be ruled on by 
the Higher Regional Court, and it specifies relevant 
evidence as well as the claims raised by the parties 
and their respective defenses. The referring order is 
binding on the Higher Regional Court and it is not 
subject to appeal (KapMuG § I).97
Once the matter has been referred, an announce-
ment is published in the electronic registry and all 
pending proceedings, that are contingent upon the 
ruling of the Higher Regional Court are stayed ex
officio (KapMuG § 7 I). The referring order deploys 
preclusive effect since no further petitions for a test 
case ruling may be submitted, but plaintiffs may still 
join the procedure.98
3.2 Higher Regional Court: Test Case Ruling
The Higher Regional Court opens the test case 
proceeding by selecting a lead plaintiff.99 The court’s 
discretion is limited by the KapMuG: When choos-
ing the lead plaintiff, the court has a duty to consider 
the individual amounts in controversy100 and it further 
has to take into account any agreements concluded 
between the claimants.101
All other plaintiffs who are listed in the complaint 
registry are not formally parties to the case, but they 
are permitted to join the test proceeding as third party 
97 Brigitta Varadinek /Thomas Asmus, Kapitalanleger-Mus-
terverfahrensgesetz: Verfahrensbeschleunigung und Ver-
besserung des Rechtsschutzes?, ZIP 29/2008, 1309 ff., 
1312, question whether the inability to file an appeal vio-
lates the constitutional right to be heard.
98 Reuschle (n. 83) 376 f. For details on the binding effect of 
the test case ruling, see below IV.3.2.
99 Duve /Pfitzner (n. 83) 677; Reuschle (n. 83) 377. Micklitz /
Stadler (n. 42) 1486, criticize that a lead plaintiff can also 
be chosen against his will, given the required amount of 
time and effort to prepare proceedings and they, therefore, 
postulate compensation through an adequate distribution 
of costs. Similar, Burkhard Hess /Chrisoula Michailidou,
Das Gesetz über Musterverfahren zu Schadenersatzklagen 
von Kapitalanlegern, Anmerkungen zum Diskussionsent-
wurf des Bundesministeriums, ZIP 2004, 1381 ff., 1385 f.;
Franz Braun /Klaus Rotter, Der Diskussionsentwurf zum 
KapMuG – Verbesserter Anlegerschutz?, BKR 8/2004, 
296 ff., 299.
100 KapMuG § 8 II presumes that the plaintiff with the high-
est claim has the biggest interest in the test case. The 
KapMuG, in this regard, resembles the concept of the 
“most adequate plaintiff ”, introduced with the PSLRA in 
the U.S. (see above n. 19). See further, Micklitz / Stadler
(n. 42) 1486.
101 Hess /Michailidou (n. 99) 1385.
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petitioners. They have a separate constitutional right 
to be heard, which includes the rights to raise their 
own objections, state their own arguments, attend 
trial and submit evidence, provided that their conduct 
does not contradict the test case plaintiff ’s position 
(KapMuG § 12 f.).102
Provided that the constitutional right to be heard 
was properly respected, the test case ruling deploys 
binding force not only on the lead plaintiff, but on all 
parties summoned to the test case; there is no opt-out 
provision.103 Withdrawal of a claim is, in principle, 
possible; however, the claimant is still bound by the 
test case ruling if he or she withdrew only after the 
matter was referred to the Higher Regional Court. 
The test case ruling is also binding upon on all trial 
courts whose pending cases are contingent on the rul-
ing in the test case.
As the test case ruling directly influences the out-
come of a number of disputes, it may be appealed 
before the BGH by all the parties as well as by the 
third party petitioners (KapMuG § 15 I [3]). The par-
ties to the test case may also agree on a settlement,
provided that all third party petitioners agree (Kap-
MuG § 14 III).
3.3 Trial Court: Adjudication of Individual Awards 
for Damages
Once the test case ruling has become final, the 
trial courts resume all pending proceedings and adju-
dicate damages based on the merits of each individual
case. Plaintiffs usually have to prove individual reli-
ance on misrepresentations contained in the deficient 
disclosure documents. Hence, even if the test case 
ruling determined the common questions of fact or 
law in the plaintiffs’ favor, the individual actions may 
still fail. Still, as far as misstatements or omissions 
in a prospectus are concerned, the German Stock Ex-
102 Interested parties summoned enjoy a status which is com-
parable to an auxiliary intervener. They have, however, 
only restricted access to the records and the court is not 
obliged to give comprehensive notice on all intermediate 
procedural steps. See KapMuG § 8 III, 10 III, IV, § 12 and 
§ 13. See also, Baetge (n. 93) 19; Micklitz / Stadler (n. 42)
1487; Reuschle (n. 83) 376.
103 On the binding force of a test case ruling, cf. Kap-
MuG § 16. But see below, n. 115, with regard to limita-
tions on binding force due to the constitutional right to be 
heard.
change Act provides for a shifting of the burden of 
proof in favour of the investor.104
4. Benefits and Shortcomings
4.1 Judicial Economy
The KapMuG has not significantly improved ju-
dicial economy of investors’ claims for damages.105
This is chiefly due to the following features of the test 
case proceeding:
The current design of the test case proceeding is
susceptible to substantial delays. The fact that third 
party petitioners may call for evidence and invoke 
their own arguments renders the proceedings rather 
cumbersome. This is notorious in the Deutsche Tele-
kom case, where, more than seven years after the ini-
tial filing, proceedings are still pending, partly due to 
the constant filing of petitions by interested parties 
summoned to the case. There is, however, no instant 
solution to this problem, given the broad conception 
of the constitutional right to be heard.106
The KapMuG does not discharge the trial courts 
from dealing with each single law suit individually, 
since the Higher Regional Court may only deliver a 
declaratory judgment but not award damages to indi-
vidual investors.107 Thus, at a minimum, two separate 
courts have to deal with a specific claim, not taking 
into account a possible appeal. Further, if an investor 
files a lawsuit against a non-domestic issuer, the ex-
clusive venue as provided for in § 32b of the German 
Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable and, hence, 
it is even possible that several trial courts will deal 
with the same subject matter.
Lastly, the KapMuG’s narrow scope of applica-
tions impedes judicial efficiency. It is easy to hypo-
104 Cf. BörsG § 45 II. This is usually referred to as the “An-
lagestimmung”-doctrine. The BGH has, however, refused 
to apply this theory to current reports regarding price-sen-
sitive facts (so-called “ad-hoc publicity”; BGH, decision 
of 4.6.2007, II ZR 147/05; II ZR 173/05, ComRoad). See 
in this context also above, n. 75.
105 Commentators, overall, have criticized the lack of expe-
diency of the test case proceedings. See, e.g., Dorothee 
Ertmann /Thomas Keul, Das Vorlageverfahren nach dem 
KapMuG – zugleich eine Bestandsaufnahme zur Effek-
tivität des Kapitalanlegermusterverfahrens, WM 2007,
482 ff., 482, 485; Jahn (n. 85) 1316; Micklitz / Stadler
(n. 42) 1487 f.; Varadinek /Asmus (n. 97) 1314.
106 On this problem, see Micklitz / Stadler (n. 42) 1488.
107 The test case proceeding merely leads to an interlocutory 
judgment. See Baetge (n. 93) 9.
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thesize a case in which certain aspects could be ruled 
on in a test case proceeding, but where other ques-
tions – even though of common interest to all plain-
tiffs’ involved – would have to be tried separately by 
each single plaintiff.108 For the sake of judicial econ-
omy, the German legislature should, therefore, con-
sider expanding the restricted scope of the KapMuG 
to all securities-related claims susceptible to mass 
litigation, if not even to codify test case proceedings 
in the German Civil Procedure Code, so as to allow 
test cases in any area of law where common questions 
of law or fact predominate.
4.2 Consistency of Jurisdiction and Efficient 
Enforcement of Securities Laws
Securities-related actions usually involve a high 
degree of complexity with regard to both the under-
lying facts and the legal questions at issue. Most trial 
courts are ill-equipped to handle this complexity. The 
KapMuG adequately addresses this problem by re-
serving jurisdiction over test case rulings to the High-
er Regional Courts. As the Higher Regional Courts 
rank high in the overall courts’ hierarchy, this has the 
beneficial effect of ensuring consistent rulings. As a 
result, potential defendants profit from raised aware-
ness of the current interpretation of the law, whereas 
investors are likely to profit indirectly from improved 
business conduct by issuers and other market players.
By stipulating high requirements for a settlement
of the test case proceeding,109 the KapMuG further 
raises the chances that securities-related disputes are 
adjudicated by a court. It thereby enhances legal cer-
tainty for all market players and guarantees overall 
stability of the law. In the U.S., to the contrary, the 
chances that the merits of a securities class action 
will actually be decided by a court are very slim. Sta-
tistics show that there is a very high likelihood for an 
out-of-court settlement as soon as class certification 
is granted. The current design of directors and offi-
cers (D&O) insurance policies further settlements as 
insurance coverage usually does not extend to willful 
or recklessness actions which may be determined in 
 108 For example, test case proceedings are not available if 
breaches of an investment advisory contract are at issue 
(see above n. 89).
109 Cf. KapMuG § 14 III. See, however, the critical comments 
by Keller /Kolling (n. 83) 403.
a court ruling but remain unexamined or undisclosed 
in a settlement.110
4.3 Investors’ Facilitated Access to Justice
Compared to the previous legal situation, there is 
no question that the KapMuG has enhanced invest-
ors’ access to justice and thereby improved investors’ 
position on financial markets overall. The availability 
of test case proceedings renders it more likely that af-
fected investors will file an action for damages, even 
if the losses suffered by each of them are very small. 
It is beneficial that, in terms of numerosity, test cases 
under the KapMuG are subject to rather low require-
ments, especially if compared to a securities class 
action under FRCP Rule 23 (3)(b).111 Electronic re-
gistration of pending petitions ensures investors’ ac-
cess to relevant information, which further increases 
the likelihood of the filing of a lawsuit.
The motivation to file a petition for a test case is 
mainly based on the fact that duplication of work and 
costs can be avoided, since the costs of the test case 
will be apportioned to all registered plaintiffs (Kap-
MuG § 17 III). This is of special importance with a 
view to the taking of (expert) evidence.112 However, 
under the current set-up of the KapMuG, every single 
investor is still required to file his or her own peti-
tion to the court and to advance the respective court 
fees. This makes little sense, especially if the mat-
ter has already been referred to the Higher Regional 
Court.113
110 Hess (n. 21) 116.
111 FRCP Rule 23 (a)(1) does not provide for a specific nu-
meric threshold, but the class must be so numerous that 
individual joinder is impracticable. According to current 
case law, if the class only comprises 15–20 plaintiffs, 
courts will usually find that joinder was practicable. How-
ever, if the class consists of at least 100 or more plaintiffs, 
the numerosity requirement is clearly met. At any rate, the 
courts will decide on the basis of the specific circumstances
of a case and ponder different policy aspects, such as, e.g., 
judicial economy, prevention of litigation, geographic 
dispersion of class members, hardship or inconvenience, 
resources of class members and their ability to commence 
individual suits. For details, see Klonoff /Bilich /Malveaux
(n. 12) 69 ff.
112 In this context, see Baetge (n. 93) 25, for an overview 
of the enormous costs of obtaining expert evidence in 
Deutsche Telekom.
113 For a critique, see Hess /Michailidou (n. 99) 1386; Braun /
Rotter (n. 99) 297. The authors conclude that, for an 
amount in controversy of EUR 10 000.– each plaintiff 
would have to advance costs of EUR 1344.–.
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Pursuant to KapMuG § 8, institutional investors
are most likely to be selected as lead plaintiffs. This is 
sensible since not only do they usually have the great-
est stake in a lawsuit for damages due to the large 
size of their investments, but they also dispose of all 
the necessary resources (e.g., sophisticated know-
how, technical infrastructure, legal advice, etc.) to 
adequately represent all affected investors’ interests. 
In limiting the Higher Regional Court’s choice of the 
test case plaintiff, the KapMuG, therefore, ensures 
fairness for both institutional and retail investors.
4.4 Respect of Due Process
The KapMuG contains several provisions that 
safeguard the autonomy of all investors who join the 
test case proceeding.114 Since the claimants in a test 
case proceeding do not form a “class”, however, there 
is neither an “opt-in” nor an “opt-out” mechanism. 
Once a trial court has approved petitions for a test 
case ruling and referred the matter to the Higher Re-
gional Court the proceedings are largely self-driven 
and in the hands of the Higher Regional Court. 
Hence, the test case ruling binds all affected inves-
tors, irrespective of whether or not they took an ac-
tive part in the proceeding.115
In the light of this aspect of the test case proceed-
ing, it is rather astonishing that the German legisla-
ture showed did not enact provisions in order to en-
sure both typicality116 and adequacy117 of the test case 
plaintiff and his or her counsel, as provided for under 
114 This is especially true with regard to the rights of the 
third party petitioners, as provided for in KapMuG § 12 f.
While this typical feature of the test case proceeding has 
been positively received by some legal writers, see e.g. 
Duve /Pfitzner (n. 83) 677, it has, due to lacking judicial 
economy of the proceedings, been strongly criticized by 
others (see above n. 105).
115 Baetge (n. 93) 9, claims that investors, who joined the test 
case proceeding too late to adequately defend their inter-
ests should not be bound by the ruling in the test case.
116 According to FRCP Rule 23(a)(3), the plaintiff has to 
prove that the claims or defenses of the representative 
plaintiffs are typical of those of the class. The typicality 
requirement seeks to ensure that the case of the represen-
tative plaintiff will raise the common issues in a typical 
way. If a lead plaintiff ’s claim is atypical, there is reason to 
worry that he or she will represent the class only his or her 
own interests. Klonoff /Bilich /Malveaux (n. 12) 98 ff.
117 To prove adequacy, the moving party must show that “(1) 
the plaintiff does not have interests antagonistic to that of 
the class, and (2) that the plaintiff ’s attorneys have the ex-
perience and ability to conduct the litigation”. Rubenstein
FRCP Rule 23. It is certainly true that, due to the fun-
damentally different rules relating to costs,118 there is 
almost no danger of “races to the courtroom” in civil 
law jurisdictions.119 Still, even under the KapMuG,
both the test case plaintiff and the test case counsel 
assume a key role and there certainly are potential 
areas of abuse: Given the publicity involved in a 
large-scale test case, an attorney might have a self-
serving interest in assuming the role of lead counsel. 
Further, counsels of interested parties summoned to 
the test case have only limited access to the files and 
are also restricted in their pleadings (KapMuG § 12).
Most attorneys would, therefore, prefer to assume the 
role of lead counsel so as not to lose control and in-
fluence over the outcome of the test case.120
V. Conclusion
Policymakers have taken different approaches to 
confronting the complex problem of large-scale se-
curities litigation. They range from an extremely in-
dividualistic approach (joinder) to an extremely col-
lectivist approach (class actions). Most jurisdictions 
in Europe, however, have opted for hybrid procedural 
devices, such as representative actions, “opt-in”-style 
group actions or test cases.
Despite its somewhat longwinded procedural 
structure and, hence, its insufficient contribution to 
enhance judicial economy, the KapMuG contains 
some useful and innovative approaches to tackling 
the small claims dilemma in the context of securi-
ties litigation. It ensures judicial clarification on com-
mon factual and legal questions, thereby providing 
for consistency of jurisdiction as well as for an ef-
ficient enforcement of disclosure rules with regard to 
publicly offered securities. Compared to the filing of 
individual lawsuits, test case proceedings entail con-
siderable economy of scale benefits which – especial-
ly with a view to large-scale cases – ensure a more 
efficient use of both public and private resources. At 
the same time, test case proceedings are in line with 
v. Collins, 162 F.R.D. 534, 538–539 (S.D. Tex. 1995). See
Klonoff /Bilich /Malveaux (n. 12) 125 ff.
118 English Rule as opposed to American Rule (see above 
n. 50). There are no contingency fees in European juris-
dictions, except for Italy, Spain and Ireland (and only in 
restricted circumstances; see above n. 50).
119 Hess /Michailidou (n. 99) 1385.
120 Duve /Pfitzner (n. 83) 677 ff.
Contratto: Access to Justice for Investors in the Wake of the Financial Crisis190 SZW/RSDA 3/2009
the longstanding traditions of continental European 
civil procedure and they respect fundamental consti-
tutional principles, such as the right to be heard. An-
other major benefit of the KapMuG’s current design 
lies in the fact that, unlike in the U.S., the majority of 
cases will not be decided in out-of-court settlements, 
but will in fact be decided in court. This raises legal 
certainty and prevents abuses usually referred to as 
“legal blackmail”.
From a Swiss perspective, the KapMuG is among 
the most promising approaches to tackling the issue 
of investors’ collective redress. Compared to solu-
tions that have been developed by other civil law ju-
risdictions, the concept of test cases would probably 
best fit into the Swiss legal culture. Overall, our legal 
system is still a lot more inclined to individualistic 
rather than to collectivist approaches. This is why 
public interest association lawsuits have never played 
a major role in Switzerland, unlike, for instance, in 
the French and the Italian traditions, a fact which is 
highlighted by the extremely small number of such 
public interest associations in Switzerland. The nu-
merosity requirement, however, would need to be 
handled pragmatically. Meeting the threshold of ten 
applications for a test case ruling, as required under 
the KapMuG, could prove difficult, considering the 
small size of Switzerland and our legal culture which 
to date has been less litigious than that of our neigh-
bour to the north.
It remains to be seen whether lawsuits filed by 
the “Lehman victims” and other irate investors will 
really place a barely manageable workload on the 
Swiss courts. Should social and political pressure 
to improve investors’ collective redress consider-
ably rise, test case proceedings, as provided for in the 
KapMuG, could certainly serve as a valuable point 
of reference for the Swiss lawmaker. Still, when it 
comes to improving access to justice, test cases are 
certainly not the panacea that many investors were 
hoping for. A moderate alleviation of the burden of 
proof regarding loss causation and reliance in actions 
for “prospectus liability” is at least equally impor-
tant. When addressing the issue, the Swiss legislature 
would, therefore, do well in performing an overall 
assessment of both the procedural rules and the pro-
visions of substantive law which currently impede 
investors’ access to justice.
